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Meaningful Information, Meaningful
Retention
JORDAN M. SINGER†
Judicial retention elections are at a crossroads. Less
than twenty years ago, they were seen as relatively sleepy
affairs, characterized by low voter turnout and little or no
campaigning. But times have changed. In 2010, high court
judges in six states were targeted for non-retention by wellorganized and well-financed opposition groups with overtly
political agendas.1 Although these efforts mostly proved
unsuccessful, anti-retention forces appear to be gaining
resilience with each election cycle.2 Once heralded as a
relatively
apolitical
means
of
ensuring
judicial
accountability, retention elections now face an uncertain
future.
In his recent Article, Professor Todd Pettys suggests
that we may have reached a breaking point.3 Briefly
summarized, his contention is this: modern anti-retention
campaigns are particularly powerful because they are able
to tap into voters’ moral outrage over controversial court

† Assistant Professor of Law, New England Law | Boston. I am grateful to
Tigran Eldred, Lawrence Friedman, and Louis Schulze for helpful comments on
earlier drafts.
1. See Roy A. Schotland, Iowa’s 2010 Judicial Election: Appropriate
Accountability or Rampant Passion?, 46 CT. REV. 118, 118 (2010).
2. See ADAM SKAGGS ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 200910, at 27 (2011) (“More assaults on impartial courts, taking a range of different
forms, are on the horizon.”).
3. Todd E. Pettys, Judicial Retention Elections, the Rule of Law, and the
Rhetorical Weaknesses of Consequentialism, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 69, 78 (2012).
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decisions.4 That outrage, in the form of a moral mandate,
overpowers the public’s general deference to the courts as
fair and impartial arbiters of the law, making voters more
willing to remove judges who issue controversial decisions.5
Moreover, the traditional arguments in favor of judicial
retention—that judges should not be punished at election
time for doing their jobs (the “deontological argument”)6 and
that judges should not feel pressure to reach politically
popular (rather than legally correct) outcomes (the
“consequentialist argument”)7—prove ineffective with
morally outraged voters. In short, the dynamics of retention
elections have changed, and the pro-retention arguments
that may have resonated with the public a generation ago
no longer work. Using the unsuccessful 2010 retention bids
of three Iowa Supreme Court Justices as one recent
example of the weakness of traditional arguments, Pettys
concludes that retention elections should either be
reimagined as staging grounds for vibrant policy debates
over case outcomes, or simply eliminated altogether.8
Professor Pettys’s Article offers a highly instructive
account of the way that traditional pro-retention arguments
fall short in the face of moral mandates. That account,
however, only tells part of the story. And it is the rest of the
story—comprising voter concerns about procedural fairness
and the proper role of the judiciary, and the equivalent
failure of traditional pro-retention arguments to address
those concerns—that provides a clearer guide for the future
of retention elections. This Response offers an alternative
reading of the 2010 elections—the Iowa election in
particular—and suggests the pro-retention forces should
worry less about responding to moral mandates and more
about bolstering the public’s faith in the institutional
legitimacy of the judiciary.
Social science research has identified two factors that
drive voter decision-making in retention elections. First,
citizens typically view judicial legitimacy and accountability
in sociological terms, meaning that they expect judges first
4. Id. at 127-30.
5. Id. at 130-32.
6. Id. at 89-93.
7. Id. at 93-99.
8. Id. at 78.
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and foremost to embrace fair, neutral, and trustworthy
procedures,9 and resist any invitation to overstep the court’s
limited constitutional role.10 At the same time, retention
voters are rationally ignorant, meaning that they generally
will not invest much (if any) time to learn about their
sitting judges before going to the polls.11 Instead, most
voters will simply assume as a default that judges are
acting in a procedurally fair and institutionally sound
manner unless presented with information to the contrary.12
Together, these strains of reasoning typically work to keep
incumbent judges in office. So strong is the presumption
that incumbent judges are competent, fair, and trustworthy
that only pervasive evidence of dereliction of these qualities
will spur a successful non-retention vote.13
A controversial case outcome may be seen as evidence of
such dereliction, at least to some voters in some
circumstances. As Professor Pettys points out, if a person
finds a case outcome to be morally outrageous, her view of
the court’s commitment to fairness and trustworthiness
may diminish, and she may feel an incentive to replace the
sitting judge(s) with new judges whose moral compasses are
9. See Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in
Public Satisfaction, 44 CT. REV. 4, 4 (2007) (“[Procedural fairness]
is a value that the American public expects and demands from judges . . . .”); see
also Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of
Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion
Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 786 (1994); Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski,
Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular
United States Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
621, 627 (1991) (finding that, despite unpopular Supreme Court decisions, most
people believe that the Court follows fair procedures in making its decisions).
10. Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1139, 1140 (2002) (“[T]he gravamen of the [judicial activism] charge is
not simply that the Court is getting things wrong on the merits, but that it has
somehow overstepped its institutional role.”).
11. See Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter
Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV.
1141, 1153-54 (2003); Ilya Somin, Knowledge About Ignorance: New Directions
in the Study of Political Information, 18 CRITICAL REV. 255, 257-58 (2006).
12. I have developed this observation in more detail elsewhere. See Jordan M.
Singer, The Mind of the Judicial Voter, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 11), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1937742.
13. Id.
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similar to her own.14 Pettys suggests that this type of “moral
mandate” was at work in the 2010 Iowa judicial retention
election: an angry electorate, brimming with moral outrage
over the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision to overturn the
state’s Defense of Marriage Act, ousted three Justices who
sought retention.15 This view reflects the now-conventional
wisdom about the Iowa retention election. But there is more
to the story.
The historical facts are plain enough. In April 2009, the
Iowa Supreme Court unanimously held in Varnum v. Brien
that state legislation restricting marriage to one man and
one woman violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Iowa
Constitution.16 The decision angered many conservative and
religious groups in Iowa (and nationwide), who pledged to
override the ruling through political and non-political
means.17 However, political avenues against same-sex
marriage in Iowa quickly dried up when Governor Chet
Culver and the state legislature ruled out support for a
marriage amendment to the state constitution.18 Anger over
the Varnum decision accordingly coalesced into a campaign
to oppose the three Supreme Court Justices who would be
seeking retention in November 2010. After a bitter
campaign in which proponents spent $400,000 to retain the
Justices and opponents spent twice that to unseat them,19
all three Justices fell short of the threshold needed for
retention.20

14. Pettys, supra note 3, at 131-32.
15. Id. at 70.
16. 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009).
17. See Schotland, supra note 1, at 120-21.
18. See Mike Glover, Iowa Gov Cool to Attempting Gay-Marriage Reversal,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 7, 2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
huff-wires/20090407/iowa-gay-marriage/; Rod Boshart, Culver Praises Legislature for Not Taking Up Gay Marriage, SIOUX CITY J. (Mar. 31, 2010, 2:14 PM),
http://siouxcityjournal.com/news/state-and-regional/iowa/article_c0ecb378-3cf911df-8dd0-001cc4c002e0.html.
19. Press Release, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, 2010 Judicial Elections Increase
Pressure on Courts, Reform Groups Say (Nov. 3, 2010), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Democracy/release-november%202010-110
310-final.pdf.
20. Schotland, supra note 1, at 120.
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Moral outrage unquestionably fed the anti-retention
campaign in Iowa, but moral mandates alone cannot explain
the election result. The numbers simply don’t add up. A
statewide survey taken shortly before oral argument in the
Varnum case found that only 32% of Iowans opposed samesex marriage in any form, with 28% supporting same-sex
marriage, and another 30% opposing marriage but
supporting civil unions.21 In other words, less than one-third
of Iowans were predisposed to experience the deep and
strongly held moral outrage over same-sex marriage that
would be necessary to overcome the baseline inclination
that the court’s decision was procedurally legitimate.22 Yet
54% of Iowa voters chose not to retain the Justices. Some
factor other than moral outrage was necessary for the antiretention movement to succeed on a statewide scale.23
That additional factor was not a moral concern, but a
sociological one: the widespread belief that the Iowa
Supreme Court had overstepped its institutional role in
directly legalizing same-sex marriage. This perception was
fueled by anti-retention forces, whose primary theme
throughout the campaign was not “Varnum was wrong for
moral reasons” but rather “Varnum was wrong for
institutional reasons.”24 Indeed, a study of letters to editor
21. Press Release, Univ. of Iowa, Big Ten Battleground Poll: Iowans’ Views
on Gay Marriage and Civil Unions 1 (Dec. 1, 2008), available at http://newsreleases.uiowa.edu/2008/november/112508gaymarriagetopline.pdf.
22. See Linda J. Skitka & Elizabeth Mullen, The Dark Side of Moral
Conviction, 2 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 35, 37 (2002) (describing a
moral mandate as “a strong attitude with an equally strong moral investment”).
23. The level of support for same-sex marriage in Iowa in the pre-Varnum
poll was not an anomaly, but part of a trend toward greater acceptance of samesex marriage in Iowa. A 2010 poll, taken well after Varnum, but before the
retention election, found that support for same-sex marriage in the state had
grown to 44%. See Andrew Gelman et al., Over Time, a Gay Marriage
Groundswell, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2010, at WK3. Similarly, a poll from August
2011 found that only 29% of Iowans opposed same-sex marriage in any form,
while 40% supported gay marriage and another 30% supported civil unions. See
Press Release, Public Policy Polling, Iowans Up on Gay Marriage and Branstad
(Aug. 26, 2011), available at http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/pdf/PPP
_Release_IA_0826.pdf.
24. See Tyler J. Buller, Framing the Debate: Understanding Iowa’s 2010
Judicial Retention Election Through a Content Analysis of Letters to the Editor,
97 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 22), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1793313.
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appearing in Iowa newspapers prior to the election found
that nearly 70% of anti-retention letters argued against
Varnum based on institutional overreach themes like
“usurping the will of the people” and “legislating from the
bench.”25 By contrast, less than 12% of anti-retention letters
derided Varnum for religious or moral reasons.26 The
messaging of the anti-retention forces in Iowa, then, was
much more sophisticated and richly textured than a simple
tap into the reservoir of moral outrage or an appeal to
sacred values. The middle ground of voters did not need to
be morally outraged by Varnum to cast a vote against the
three Justices; they merely needed to believe that the Court
had improperly assumed the responsibility of the legislature
in effectuating an important social policy.
In the face of this institutional critique, the traditional
arguments offered by pro-retention forces were doomed to
fail. Supporters of retention argued that the Court was
simply “doing its job”27 and that a vote against retention was
“a vote against the judicial system.”28 But these
deontological arguments did not—and could not—resonate
with voters who viewed the court as overstepping its
constitutional bounds. In other words, saying that judges
should not be fired for doing their jobs will not work if
voters perceive those judges as not doing their jobs, but
instead intruding into the proper domain of the legislature.
Similarly, consequentialist arguments lack rhetorical power
in light of concerns about sociological accountability because
the public generally believes that judges should be held
accountable for procedural fairness and upholding the
ideals of the court as an institution. Put differently, if
25. Id. (manuscript at 22-23).
26. Id. (manuscript at 22). Pettys cites to this study, but conflates the
arguments, noting merely that “more than 85% of the anti-retention letterwriters condemned Varnum in one manner or another . . . .” Pettys, supra note
3, at 85. But the nature of the condemnation is the key to understanding the
motivation for a non-retention vote.
27. Pettys, supra note 3, at 90 (quoting Rob Potts, Letter to the Editor,
Justices Did Not “Make Law;” They Interpreted It, OTTUMWA COURIER ONLINE
(Oct. 22, 2010), http://ottumwacourier.com/letters/x693285242/Justices-did-notmake-law-they-interpreted-it).
28. Id. (quoting Alan L. Egly, Letter to the Editor, Don’t Vote Against Judge
Based on Self-Interest, Ideology, QUAD-CITIES ONLINE (Oct. 27, 2010),
http://www.qconline.com/archives/qco/display.php?id=516205).
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judges are so independent that they disregard the very
procedures and institutional arrangements that are
designed to ensure fair and accurate outcomes, those judges
should be replaced—or at least should feel pressure to
change their behavior in the face of public disapproval.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the perception of
the Iowa Supreme Court’s institutional overreach was
actually grounded in reality. Indeed, any fair reading of the
Varnum opinion shows it to be cautious and carefully
constructed, demonstrating an explicit awareness of the
limited role of the judiciary in a government premised on
the separation of powers. But surely most Iowa voters did
not read the court’s opinion. As rationally ignorant voters,
they instead relied on information that could be obtained
passively or with little effort, and most of that “information”
consisted of the opposition’s relentless drumbeat of judicial
activism and warnings that the Justices were “legislating
from the bench.” In the end, the middle ground voters who
would eventually decide the election swung against the
three Justices not because of moral outrage, but because
they had become convinced that the Justices had not met
their commitment to sociological accountability.
The dynamics of voter decision-making based on
sociological accountability illustrate both the strengths and
the limitations of the “fairness and impartiality” rhetoric
that characterizes traditional pro-retention arguments.
Given public concern that their courts remain fair,
impartial, and unwilling to succumb to the temptation of
institutional overreach, it is of course essential that proretention forces remind voters that their incumbent judges
embrace these qualities. But merely asserting fairness and
impartiality is no longer enough. Such qualities must also
be demonstrated to the public.
And therein lies the key to the future of judicial
retention elections. Voters are hungry for information
concerning their judges’ commitment to procedural fairness
and tendency to avoid institutional overreach. Pro-retention
forces historically have not bothered to supply such
information to voters, because in an information vacuum,
most rationally ignorant voters will adopt the default
position that judges are good enough to retain. But antiretention forces are now filling that vacuum, and voters will
gravitate toward any easily accessible information, accurate
or not. Pro-retention forces can no longer rely on the lack of
meaningful information to do their work for them. They
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must be prepared to provide substantial information on
judges’ sociological accountability early and often in the
election cycle.
The ongoing relevance of sociological accountability to
voters—both with respect to campaign rhetoric and with
respect to concrete information on the performance of
sitting judges—is not just theoretical. The 2010 election
season saw more efforts to unseat state high court justices
than perhaps ever before.29 Anti-retention forces in Alaska,
Colorado, Florida, Illinois, and Kansas pushed for removal
of one or more jurists, and in many states the push was
sparked by a single court decision on a controversial issue.30
Yet in every state except Iowa, the justices were retained,
many by comfortable margins.31 Several factors likely
contributed to this discrepancy, but the ready availability of
information on judges’ commitment to sociological
accountability in the other states clearly played a
significant role. Most obviously, states like Alaska,
Colorado, and Kansas enjoyed robust state-sponsored
judicial performance evaluation (“JPE”) programs, which
expressly review each judge’s performance with respect to
procedural fairness factors like clarity of communication,
demonstrated impartiality, judicial temperament, integrity,
and administrative capacity, and place the results in voter
guides prior to the election.32 JPE programs also inquire
about judicial humility and each judge’s commitment to
deciding only issues that are properly within the court’s
jurisdiction and institutional role.33 Unfortunately, the Iowa
29. See Schotland, supra note 1, at 118.
30. Larry Aspin, The 2010 Judicial Retention Elections in Perspective:
Continuity and Change from 1964 to 2010, 94 JUDICATURE 218, 228-29 tbl.3
(2011) (listing states holding retention elections in 2010 and describing the
reason for opposition to retention in each state).
31. Id.
32. See Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, Using Judicial
Performance Evaluations to Promote Judicial Accountability, 90 JUDICATURE
200, 203-05 (2007) (listing states with JPE programs, including Alaska,
Colorado, and Kansas, and noting that Alaska and Colorado have two of the
most developed JPE programs).
33. For example, the Colorado Judicial Performance Evaluation Program
asks attorneys to evaluate appellate judges on, among other things, each judge’s
commitment to “[r]efraining from reaching issues that need not be decided.”
COLO. OFFICE OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, APPELLATE
QUESTIONNAIRE, available at http://www.coloradojudicialperformance.gov/
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Justices benefitted from no such program, leaving their
judicial careers exclusively at the mercy of election year
hype. Perhaps more importantly, the critical swing voters in
Iowa were forced to rely exclusively on partisan messaging
with respect to the sociological accountability issues that
mattered most to them.
Given the voters’ primary interest in procedural
fairness and institutional legitimacy and the ongoing
potential of JPE programs to provide information relevant
to those interests, it is not clear that the only choices are to
either eliminate retention elections altogether or encourage
sitting judges to engage in external defenses of their
decisions. If judicial retention voters only cared about case
outcomes or substantive judicial policymaking, such
engagement might be appropriate. But most people care
about the process of judicial decision-making as well as
outcomes—indeed, typically they care about process much
more than outcomes. Studies have consistently shown that
support for appellate courts is linked “to judgments that the
decisions, whether favorable or unfavorable, were made
using procedures that are competent, reasonable, and
fair.”34 It is therefore hard to see the benefit of infusing
retention elections with full-fledged policy debates about the
wisdom of specific case outcomes. Such debates are unlikely
to influence a change in position among the minority of
voters who are driven by a moral mandate, and at the same
time are likely to erode the court’s legitimacy among voters
who do not have strongly held moral convictions on the
issues.
For related reasons, the proposed elimination of
retention elections altogether also seems unwise. Even if
such a move were politically feasible, it would be ill-advised
because it would deny voters the reasonable opportunity to
hold their judges accountable for transgressions that voters
do find important: violations of procedural fairness or lack
of commitment to protecting and preserving the court’s
institutional legitimacy. All this is to say that case outcomes
may drive some non-retention votes in any given election,
but concern about moral mandates alone is insufficient to
documents/CO%20Attnys%20re%20COA%20&%20SC%20Judges-Justices%20
questions%20revised1.pdf.
34. Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 786.

10

THE DOCKET

[Vol. 60

justify radical changes to retention elections as we know
them.
For most voters in most retention elections, judicial
accountability begins and ends with sociological
accountability. Has the judge demonstrated a commitment
to the trappings of procedural fairness—the opportunity for
all parties to be heard, fair consideration of all the evidence,
and a clear explanation of the court’s decision? Has the
judge acted as a trusted public servant and a worthy
guardian of the court’s institutional legitimacy? The judges
who show themselves to be knowledgeable, humble,
impartial, and trustworthy tend to win favor with a
majority of voters, even when some percentage of the voting
public strongly disagrees with one or more of their
decisions.35 By contrast, the judges who are perceived to be
boorish, haughty, disinterested, unclear, intellectually
overwhelmed, or unprofessional are far less likely to survive
a retention bid.36
We are right to be concerned with many of the recent
trends in judicial elections. And it is near certain that
morally outraged groups will continue to seek ouster of
state judges based on case outcomes for the foreseeable
future. But the solution, it seems to me, is to return to the
principles of judicial accountability that already occupy the
minds of most citizens. Every state with retention elections
should conduct formal performance evaluations of its judges
based on criteria related to the process of adjudication, and
provide those evaluation results to the public in advance of
the election. If the evaluations are strong, pro-retention
forces should adopt strategies to remind voters that the
judge in question has demonstrated a commitment to
procedural fairness and preserving the legitimacy of the
court. If the evaluations are poor, all interested parties—
including those who are typically supportive of sitting
judges—should debate whether the judge really deserves
retention. In either event, the retention decision will better
reflect what voters really want in their judges, and will

35. See Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, A Performance Evaluation
Program for the Federal Judiciary, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 7, 21 (2008) (providing a
detailed example of a state judge who was retained despite making a
controversial, high-profile ruling in an adverse possession case).
36. See Aspin, supra note 30, at 225.
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naturally dissipate some of the concerns about moral
mandates within a minority of the voting population.

